The Hash That Started With a Zero Byte — Python Bug Hunt
Modelled on the Nintendo Wii "Trucha" signing bug, found by the homebrew community around 2008.
- Language: Python
- Layer: Backend
- Difficulty: Medium
- Concepts: Security, Crypto, Hashing
- Modelled on: Nintendo Wii · Trucha bug 2008
- Visible tests: the genuine hash is accepted; a hash that differs in the first byte is rejected; a zero-led forgery is rejected
- Reward: 50 XP for a complete fix
Incident
- Severity: SEV-1 (priority: Critical)
- Ticket: BUG-TRUCHA
- Reported by: security
- Time to fix: 20 minutes, the target for a medium incident
Failing checks on the shipped build
- a zero-led forgery is rejected — twenty zero bytes are not that content's hash: expected a truthy value but got false
How to work this incident
- Read the report: write down the expected behaviour and the actual one in a sentence each.
- Reproduce it: run the visible tests and find the failing check that matches the report.
- Read the logs and the failing checks for the first value that is wrong — the earliest wrong value is nearer the cause than the loudest error.
- Follow the request through the handler, the validation and the service it calls; find the first step whose output disagrees with the report.
- Fix the cause rather than the symptom, run the visible tests again, and submit against the hidden ones — then write the root cause down.
Briefing
Modelled on the Nintendo Wii "Trucha" signing bug, found by the homebrew community around 2008. The Wii's system software checked a signature by recovering the signed SHA-1 hash and comparing it with the content's hash using strncmp — a string comparison that stops at the first zero byte. A forged signature that recovered to a hash beginning with 0x00, paired with content tweaked until its own hash also began with 0x00, compared "equal" after zero bytes, and unsigned software ran as if Nintendo had signed it.
This reconstruction's verify.py compares the two hashes the same way: byte by byte, stopping at the first zero.
Fix hashes_match so it compares every byte of both hashes, in constant time.
Bug report
BUG-TRUCHA · Priority: Critical · Reported by: security
hashes_match(computed, recovered) — both are bytes objects:
- True only when both have the same length AND every byte is equal
- a zero byte is an ordinary byte value, not a terminator
- the comparison must not return early on a mismatch (use a constant-time comparison such as hmac.compare_digest)
accept(content, recovered) == hashes_match(sha1(content), recovered).
Observed: content whose SHA-1 starts with 0x00 is accepted with a signature that recovers to twenty zero bytes.
Logs
[ios] title 00010001 sig check: hash[0]=00 recovered[0]=00 -> OK
[ios] launched unsigned title 00010001The code as shipped
src/ios/verify.py (editable)
digest = bug_require("./digest.py")
def hashes_match(computed, recovered):
for i in range(len(computed)):
a = computed[i]
b = recovered[i] if i < len(recovered) else 0
if a != b:
return False
if a == 0:
return True
return True
def accept(content, recovered):
return hashes_match(digest.sha1(content), recovered)
Read-only context: src/ios/digest.py.
Open the hunt to start the incident clock, edit the files, run the visible tests and submit against the hidden ones, then write the root cause down. More Python bug hunts.