The Login Key Made of Passwords — JavaScript Bug Hunt
Modelled on Ashley Madison (2015): after attackers published the site's user database, its passwords turned out to be hashed with bcrypt — slow to crack.
- Language: JavaScript
- Layer: Database
- Difficulty: Medium
- Concepts: Security, Auth
- Modelled on: Ashley Madison · 2015
- Visible tests: the password verifies; the login key is random, not derived from the password
- Reward: 50 XP for a complete fix
Incident
- Severity: SEV-1 (priority: Critical)
- Ticket: BUG-LOGINKEY
- Reported by: security review
- Time to fix: 20 minutes, the target for a medium incident
Failing checks on the shipped build
- the login key is random, not derived from the password — second 16 random bytes: expected "101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" but got "1c64874a438ba04c14a4979c7014362c"
How to work this incident
- Read the report: write down the expected behaviour and the actual one in a sentence each.
- Reproduce it: run the visible tests and find the failing check that matches the report.
- Read the logs and the failing checks for the first value that is wrong — the earliest wrong value is nearer the cause than the loudest error.
- Follow the data through the query or the repository code; compare the rows it returns with the rows the report expects.
- Fix the cause rather than the symptom, run the visible tests again, and submit against the hidden ones — then write the root cause down.
Briefing
Modelled on Ashley Madison (2015): after attackers published the site's user database, its passwords turned out to be hashed with bcrypt — slow to crack. But the password-cracking group CynoSure Prime found a second stored value, $loginkey, that for older accounts was an MD5 hash of the lowercased username and lowercased password. Cracking those fast hashes recovered about 11 million passwords, and the bcrypt protection counted for nothing.
register.js is a reconstruction. The password hash itself is fine (hashing.passwordHash is a salted, slow hash); the auto-login key stored beside it is derived from the password.
Fix register so nothing stored with the account is derived from the password except the slow hash.
Bug report
BUG-LOGINKEY · Priority: Critical · Reported by: security review
register(username, password, rng) returns { username, salt, passwordHash, loginKey } (in that key order) where rng(n) returns n random bytes (integers 0–255):
- salt = hashing.hex(rng(16)) (first call)
- passwordHash = hashing.passwordHash(password, salt)
- loginKey = hashing.hex(rng(16)) (second call) — random, and independent of the username and the password
verify(record, password) -> true exactly when the password matches.
Observed: loginKey is hashing.fastDigest(lower(username) + "::" + lower(password)) — an unsalted fast hash of the password stored next to the bcrypt one.
Logs
[audit] users.loginkey: 32-hex values, identical for accounts with the same username+password
[audit] loginkey recomputable from fastDigest(lower(user)::lower(pass))The code as shipped
src/accounts/register.js (editable)
var hashing = require("./hashing");
// rng(n) -> n random bytes (0-255) from the CSPRNG.
exports.register = function (username, password, rng) {
var salt = hashing.hex(rng(16));
return {
username: username,
salt: salt,
passwordHash: hashing.passwordHash(password, salt),
loginKey: hashing.fastDigest(username.toLowerCase() + "::" + password.toLowerCase())
};
};
exports.verify = function (record, password) {
return hashing.passwordHash(password, record.salt) === record.passwordHash;
};
Read-only context: src/accounts/hashing.js.
Open the hunt to start the incident clock, edit the files, run the visible tests and submit against the hidden ones, then write the root cause down. More JavaScript bug hunts.